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TORTS – PRODUCT LIABILITY:
NORTH DAKOTA REJECTS THE APPARENT
MANUFACTURER DOCTRINE
Bornsen v. Pragotrade, LLC, 2011 ND 183, 804 N.W.2d 55
ABSTRACT
In Bornsen v. Pragotrade, LLC, the North Dakota Supreme Court
rejected the application of the apparent manufacturer products liability
doctrine. The doctrine imposes product liability on a seller for products
manufactured by another, but for the original seller’s purpose. Unless
prevented by statute, most jurisdictions have incorporated the doctrine.
This holding reversed Reiss v. Komatsu America Corp., where the United
States Federal District Court of North Dakota determined the state would
accept the doctrine. The North Dakota Supreme Court found the North
Dakota Legislative Assembly’s adoption of tort reform law intended to
restrict an individual’s ability to file suit against a nonmanufacturing seller
for injuries arising out of defective products. Key in this finding was the
ability of nonmanufacturing sellers to shift liability to the original
manufacturer under certain circumstances. The practical effect is an
increased likelihood of federal product liability cases being filed in a
jurisdiction outside of North Dakota. As a result, plaintiffs will need to
consider not only the acceptance of this doctrine in other jurisdictions, but
also the choice of law test established in the original filing jurisdiction.
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FACTS

Nathan Bornsen purchased a Cabela’s labeled meat grinder from a
Cabela’s retail store in East Grand Forks, Minnesota, for use in his venison
processing business located in Larimore, North Dakota.1 On November 21,
2007, while operating the grinder purchased by her husband, Ruth
Bornsen’s left hand was pulled into the grinder, resulting in four of her

1. Bornsen v. Pragotrade, LLC, 2011 ND 183, ¶ 2, 804 N.W.2d 55.
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fingers being severed.2 The Bornsens determined Pragotrade, Inc. and
Pragotrade, LLC, as its successor, were the manufacturers of the grinder,
and Cabela’s was the seller.3 The Bornsens filed suit in North Dakota state
court against Pragotrade and Cabela’s, claiming Pragotrade and Cabela’s
are liable for negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty claims.4
Cabela’s filed a motion on July 20, 2010, removing the case to the United
States Court for the District of North Dakota.5
Subsequent to the removal motion, Cabela’s filed a motion to dismiss
the Plaintiff’s alleged product liability claim under North Dakota Century
Code section 28-01.3-04, claiming Cabela’s was a nonmanufacturing seller
of the grinder.6 The Bornsens alleged the grinder had a design defect due to
large dimensions of the grinder opening, and Cabela’s failed to properly
warn the consumer of this defect.7 In its motion, Cabela’s claimed
Pragotrade was the manufacturer; however, Pragotrade denied it was the
manufacturer, but admitted assisting in designing and distributing the
grinder.8 The Bornsens alleged Cabela’s was an apparent manufacturer of
the product and should be liable.9 Federal District Court Chief Judge Ralph
Erickson considered the motion and rejected the Bornsens’ argument, based
on Reiss v. Komatsu America Corp.,10 that the North Dakota Supreme Court
would adopt the apparent manufacturing doctrine, and therefore, the federal
court should use the doctrine.11 Instead of ruling on the motion to dismiss,
Chief Judge Erickson filed an Order of Certification, pursuant to North
Dakota Rule of Appellate Procedure 47, requesting the North Dakota
Supreme Court provide a determination of whether the apparent
manufacturer doctrine is part of North Dakota law.12
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
North Dakota products liability statutes establish distinct definitions for
both a manufacturer and a seller.13 A manufacturer is defined as “a person
2. Bornsen v. Pragotrade, LLC, 2011 ND 183, ¶ 5, 804 N.W.2d 55, 57; Brief for Appellants ¶
1, Bornsen v. Pragotrade, LLC, 2011 ND 183, 804 N.W.2d 55 (No. 20110087).
3. Bornsen, ¶ 2, 804 N.W.2d at 56; Brief for Appellee at 4, Bornsen v. Pragotrade, LLC, 2011
ND 183, 804 N.W.2d 55 (No. 20110087).
4. Bornsen, ¶ 2; Brief for Appellee, supra note 3, at 4.
5. Bornsen, ¶ 2; Brief for Appellants, supra note 2, ¶ 3.
6. Bornsen, ¶ 3.
7. Id. ¶ 5, 804 N.W.2d at 57.
8. Id. ¶ 3, 804 N.W.2d at 56.
9. Id. ¶ 4, 804 N.W.2d at 57.
10. 735 F. Supp.2d 1125 (2010).
11. Bornsen, ¶ 5.
12. Id.
13. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.3-01(1), (3) (2006).
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or entity who designs, assembles, fabricates, produces, constructs, or
otherwise prepares a product or a component part of a product prior to the
sale of the product to a user or consumer.”14 Seller is defined as “any
individual or entity, including a manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor, or
retailer, who is engaged in the business of selling or leasing any product for
resale, use, or consumption.”15
These definitions distinguish
nonmanufacturing sellers and can prevent a products liability claim against
the entity if it can: (1) correctly identify the actual manufacturer, (2) not
exercise control over the design, manufacture or warning of the product, (3)
had no knowledge of the design defect, (4) did not cause the defect, and (5)
the plaintiff’s claim is not barred against the identified manufacturer due to
the appropriate statute of limitations.16
The apparent manufacturer doctrine creates the same liability imposed
on a manufacturer of a defective product for any entity that sells a product
for its own purposes, even though it was manufactured by another.17
Pursuant to the certified question submitted to the North Dakota Supreme
Court, it remained to be resolved whether the apparent manufacturer
doctrine would be adopted by the North Dakota Supreme Court. This
determination would be based on what the North Dakota Legislature
intended when it adopted product liability reform legislation and whether
that language was exclusive under the statute.18
A. HISTORY OF APPARENT MANUFACTURER DOCTRINE
The apparent manufacturer doctrine provides strict liability for a seller
of a defective product, even though the seller did not manufacture the
product, and is traced back to early common law decisions and the
American Law Institute’s (ALI’s) published Restatement (First) of Torts.19
While there has been controversy surrounding the overall development of
strict liability as pertaining to manufactured products, the apparent
manufacturer doctrine has remained in later publications of the ALI’s views
on torts.20

14. Id. § 28-01.3-01(1).
15. Id. § 28-01.3-01(3).
16. Id. § 28-01.3-04(1)-(3).
17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 14 (1998).
18. See infra Part II.A.3.
19. See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 400 (1934) (imposing liability on a
vendor selling a product made by another).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1965); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODS. LIAB. § 14 (1998). See generally Anita Bernstein, How Can a Product be Liable?, 45
DUKE L.J. 1, 3-4 (1995) (critizing the imposition of liability on a product); Marshall S. Shapo, The
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The policy reason for adopting a doctrine of nonmanufacturing seller’s
product liability is based on establishing privity of the consumer harmed by
the product with the end retailer or distributor from whom the product was
purchased.21 In addition, the doctrine prevents a vendor from advertising a
product as its own and having consumers rely on the vendor’s reputation,
but subsequently allowing the vendor to deny it is the actual manufacturer
should problems arise with the product.22 The seller is estopped from
denying it was the manufacturer when a buyer has no reasonable means to
determine the true manufacturer, and the seller concealed that identity to the
buyer.23 While these reasons form the basis for adoption of the doctrine,
other legal methods exist to identify the true manufacturer,24 and plaintiffs
have additional legal remedies for harm suffered from defective products.25
1.

Restatement Interpretation

The most recent codified language of the apparent manufacturer
doctrine treats any entity “engaged in the business of selling or otherwise
distributing products who sells or distributes as its own a product
manufactured by another is subject to the same liability as though the seller
or distributor were the product’s manufacturer.”26 This relatively recent
change clarifies the prior rule requiring anyone “who puts out as his own
product a chattel manufactured by another is subject to the same liability as
though he were its manufacturer.”27 The change reflects a reform of the
prior strict liability rule for defective products incorporated under the
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402(A), which subsumed the prior
mentioned section in regard to products liability.28
Two specific provisions of the rule stand out in this case. First, the
ALI envisioned a situation where state statutes on products liability would
treat nonmanufacturing sellers of a product more leniently than the true

Law of Products Liability: The ALI Restatement Project, 48 VAND. L. REV. 631, 646-51 (1995)
(discussing state product liability doctrines at odds with the restatement version).
21. Robert A. Sachs, Product Liability Reform and Seller Liability: A Proposal for Change,
55 BAYLOR L. REV. 1031, 1034 (2003) (citing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS § 9A, at 715 (7th ed. 2000)).
22. AM. L. PROD. LIAB. 3d § 6:2 (2005).
23. Id.
24. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.3-04(1) (2006) (imposing liability on nonmanufacturing
seller unless certified identification of actual manufacturer).
25. Lana Steven, Torts: Products Liability, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1105, 1115 (1998).
(discussing liability under agency, fraud, and misrepresentation claims).
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 14 (1998).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1965).
28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 14 cmt. a (1998). See generally 2 AM.
LAW INST., REPORTER’S STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY (1991).
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manufacturer, and to the extent a statute alters liability, the statute
supersedes the common law.29 Second, when a nonmanufacturing seller
represents a product as its own, the seller is liable as if it manufactured the
product based on the buyer’s reliance on the seller’s reputation to assure the
quality of the product.30
2.

Acceptance by Other Jurisdictions

At least twenty-three states have adopted some form of strict liability
for defective products on any retailer of a product manufactured by
another.31 Prior to this decision, and the restructuring of the apparent
manufacturer doctrine rule under the Restatement, both Michigan and
Georgia specifically rejected the doctrine.32 Michigan’s rejection of the
doctrine was based upon findings of additional theories of tort doctrine
imposing liability on a seller of defective products, including the ability of
the plaintiff to impose liability through laws on agency, fraud and
misrepresentation, as well as piercing the corporate veil on a successor
entity.33 The Michigan Supreme Court found existing protections for
consumers to pursue defective product claims were sufficient, and refused
to accept the apparent manufacturer doctrine as other available remedies
were available and adoption of the doctrine would be redundant.34
29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 14 cmt. b (1998).
30. Id. cmt. c.
31. See generally Laaperi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc., 787 F.2d 726 (1st Cir. 1986)
(applying Massachusetts law); Brock v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (S.D. Ala.
2000) (applying Alabama law); Davis v. United States Gauge, 844 F. Supp. 1443 (D. Kan. 1994)
(applying Kansas law); Carter v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co., 360 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D. Pa. 1973)
(applying Pennsylvania Law); Dildine v. Clark Equip. Co., 666 S.W.2d 692 (Ark. 1984); Cravens,
Dargan & Co. v. Pac. Indem. Co. Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d. 594 (1973); Burkhardt v. Armour & Co.,
161 A. 385 (Conn. 1932), overruled in part on other grounds by Porpora v. City of New Haven,
187 A. 668 (Conn. 1936), and overruled on other grounds by Perlstein v. Westport Sanitarium
Co., 11 Conn. Supp. 117, 1942 WL 859 (Super. Ct. 1942); Hebel v. Sherman Equip., 442 N.E.2d
199 (Ill. 1982); Dudley Sports Co. v. Schmitt, 279 N.E.2d 266 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972); Wagner v.
Larson, 136 N.W.2d 312 (Iowa 1965); Chappuis v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 358 So.2d 926 (La.
1978); Armour & Co. v. Leasure, 9 A.2d 572 (Md. 1939); Seasword v. Hilti, Inc., 537 N.W.2d
221 (Mich. 1995); Tiedje v. Haney, 239 N.W. 611 (Minn. 1931); Coca Cola Bottling Co., Inc. of
Vicksburg v. Reeves, 486 So. 2d 374 (Miss. 1986); Swindler v. Butler Mfg. Co., 426 S.W.2d 78
(Mo. 1968); Slavin v. Francis H. Leggett & Co., 177 A. 120 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1935); Willson v.
Faxon, Williams & Faxon, 101 N.E. 799 (N.Y. 1913); Rulane Gas Co. v. Montgomery Ward &
Co., 56 S.E.2d 689 (N.C. 1949); Saum v. Venick, 293 N.E.2d 313 (Ohio Ct. App. 1972); Benford
v. Berkeley Heating Co., 188 S.E.2d 841 (S.C. 1972); First Am. Nat’l Bank v. Evans, 417 S.W.2d
778 (Tenn. 1967); S. Blickman, Inc. v. Chilton, 114 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. Civ. App. Austin 1938);
Zamora v. Mobil Corp., 704 P.2d 584 (Wash. 1985); AM. L. PROD. LIAB., supra note 22, § 6:2
n.1.
32. Seasword, 537 N.W.2d at 222; Freeman v. United Cities Propane Gas of Ga., Inc., 807 F.
Supp. 1533, 1539-40 (M.D. Ga. 1992).
33. Seasword, 537 N.W.2d at 224.
34. Id.
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Similarly, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed partial summary
judgment dismissing strict liability claims for two retailers alleged to be
manufacturers selling defective propane cylinders, which resulted in an
explosion injuring a homeowner.35 The Georgia Supreme Court interpreted
the state statutory scheme on products liability to apply only to actual
manufacturers based on the language of the Georgia Tort Reform Act of
1987, which eliminated product liability claims on “a broad category of
entities that had no real role in the creation of products.”36 The North
Dakota Supreme Court made a similar determination in this case, relying on
the statutory scheme to reject adoption of the doctrine.
3.

North Dakota Statutory Changes to Products Liability Law

North Dakota, like Georgia, enacted tort reform legislation in the 1980s
to address product liability suits.37 North Dakota amended products
liability law under North Dakota Century Code section 28-01.3-01 to -04,
which prevents nonmanufacturing seller liability in defective product
claims.38 One of the initial committee meetings on the reform bill indicated
the express desire of the legislative members to reduce insurance premiums
for businesses within the state, promote economic growth, and prevent large
financial claims against retailers.39 However, no discussion was made as to
whether this protection was intended to shield out-of-state companies from
liability.40
B. REISS V. KOMATSU AMERICA CORP.
In a prior decision, a federal district court in North Dakota decided
North Dakota would likely recognize the apparent manufacturer doctrine.41
In a case before Judge Daniel Hovland, authoring the opinion, the court
considered a product liability claim on the sale of construction equipment
without a rollover protection structure.42 The immediate seller, Diesel
Machinery, leased a heavy construction vehicle to Mariner Construction.43

35. Freeman, 807 F. Supp. at 1539-40.
36. Id.; GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11.1 (2000).
37. 1987 N.D. Laws 954.
38. 1993 N.D. Laws 1120.
39. Hearing on S.B. 2351 Before the S. Judiciary Comm, N.D. Leg. Assemb. (1993)
(statements of S. Harvey Tallackson, R. Doug Payne, S. Jim Dotzenrod, & S. Joe Keller).
40. See generally id.
41. Reiss v. Komatsu Am. Corp., 735 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1133 (D.N.D. 2010).
42. Id. at 1138.
43. Id. at 1129.
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Diesel Machinery acquired the vehicle from the Galion Division of Dress
Industries, Inc., which was the precursor company of Komatsu.44
Henry Reiss was an employee of Mariner Construction and died as a
result of a rollover on the equipment.45 Pearl Reiss filed a wrongful death
suit in North Dakota state court against Mariner Construction and
Komatsu.46 Defendants filed a motion to remove the action to federal court
and subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment denying liability
based on its status under North Dakota Century Code section 28-01.3-04 as
a nonmanufacturing seller.47 In complying with North Dakota Century
Code section 28-01.3-04, Diesel Machinery filed an affidavit stating
Komatsu, as successor to Dress Industries, was the actual manufacturer,
with Komatsu asserting the true manufacturer was Tema Terra Maquinaria
Ltda., a Brazilian company.48
The court rejected Komatsu’s claim of protection under section 2801.3-04, citing extensive non-North Dakota case law in which other
jurisdictions adopted the apparent manufacturer doctrine.49 The court found
Komatsu was the equipment’s manufacturer based on the vehicle’s decals,
operator’s manual, warranty materials, and sales brochure all indicating the
manufacturer was Dresser Industries/Komatsu, and this representation to
the public under the apparent manufacturer doctrine imposed liability on
Komatsu.50 In making the determination, the court determined the statutory
language was not a bar against adoption of the apparent manufacturer
doctrine,51 as the North Dakota Supreme Court had previously adopted
other Restatement sections on strict liability in products liability actions,
and had not yet considered a case where the doctrine was accepted.52 Based
on this reasoning, the court accepted the doctrine under North Dakota law
and believed that the North Dakota Supreme Court would do likewise if
presented with an opportunity to consider the matter.53
III. ANALYSIS
In answering the certified question, the North Dakota Supreme Court
considered two separate issues. First, whether the question from the United
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id. at 1130.
Id.
Id. at 1130-32.
Id. at 1133.
Id. at 1133-34.
Id. at 1134.
Id. at 1133.
Id. at 1132.
Id. at 1133.
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States District Court of North Dakota was properly certified pursuant to the
North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure.54 Second, whether the court
would adopt the apparent manufacturer products liability doctrine.55
Writing for the majority, Justice Crothers, with Chief Justice VandeWalle
and Justice Sandstrom concurring, determined the question was properly
certified from the United States District Court, and that the apparent
manufacture doctrine is not supported under North Dakota law.56
A. MAJORITY OPINION
The North Dakota Supreme Court’s opinion centered on the intent of
the North Dakota Legislature in amending products liability law. Based on
this intent, the court ultimately rejected the doctrine. The current law
allowing a nonmanufacturing entity to escape liability precluded adoption
of the doctrine and would counter the intent of the legislature in limiting the
ability of individuals to file product liability claims.
1.

Rejection of Apparent Manufacturer Doctrine Under
Common Law

The North Dakota Supreme Court looked to the statute in question to
determine whether the North Dakota Legislature precluded adoption of the
apparent manufacturer doctrine.57 The majority cited the text of North
Dakota Century Code section 28-01.3-01 indicating separate definitions for
“manufacturer” and “seller.”58 The court also looked to North Dakota
Century Code section 28-01.3-04, which provides a separate liability
section for nonmanufacturing sellers.59 The court found these two
provisions indicated the legislature’s intent to restrict product liability
actions as a remedy for harm caused by defective products.60 The court
considered the statutory scheme so comprehensive that adoption of the
apparent manufacturer doctrine could not be recognized without
contravening the legislative intent in adopting the statute.61 The court cited
the specific conflict between common law and statutory language

54. Bornsen v. Pragotrade, LLC, 2011 ND 183, ¶ 10, 804 N.W.2d 55, 59.
55. Id. ¶¶ 1, 10-11, 804 N.W.2d at 56, 59.
56. Id. ¶¶ 10, 19, 804 N.W.2d at 59, 62.
57. See infra Part III.B on discussion of proper certification of the question considered by the
North Dakota Supreme Court.
58. Bornsen, ¶ 13, 804 N.W.2d at 59.
59. Id. at 59-60.
60. Id. ¶ 17, 804 N.W.2d at 61.
61. Id.; see infra Part III.A.2 for discussion on the legislative intent findings.
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anticipated by the drafters under the Restatement.62 The ALI indicated that
statutory provisions differentiating retail sellers from manufacturers, where
enacted in a relevant jurisdiction, would override common law doctrine
imposing liability.63
1.

Interpretation of North Dakota Century Code Based on
Statutory Language and Legislative Intent

In reaching its decision on the rejection of the apparent manufacturer
doctrine, the North Dakota Supreme Court cited state law and precedent to
interpret legislative intent.64 This indication by the Legislature requires
“the law of [North Dakota] respecting the subjects to which it relates, and
its provisions and all proceedings under it are to be construed liberally, with
a view to effecting its objects and to promoting justice.”65 Additionally,
North Dakota law requires no common law consideration may be made in a
case where the law has been declared by statute.66
In interpreting North Dakota’s products liability statutes, the court has
stated “it is for the legislature to determine policy, not the courts”67 and
“noted that ‘[i]t must be presumed that the legislature intended all that it
said, and that it said all that it intended to say.’”68 The Bornsens argued that
prior legislative action in 1979 to preempt private labelers from liability
later removed in 1987, demonstrated intent on the part of the legislature to
allow for adoption of the apparent manufacturer doctrine.69 The argument
was premised on North Dakota precedent requiring courts to find legislative
purpose in all revisions and changes to prior statutes, and this repeal
suggested private labelers could be found liable.70 However, the court
looked specifically to the legislative findings within the statute to determine
the North Dakota Legislature sought to establish “clear and predictable”
rules.71 These clear and predictable rules would preclude the adoption of

62. Bornsen, ¶ 18, 804 N.W.2d at 62 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB.
§ 14 (1998)).
63. Id. ¶ 18; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 14 cmt. b (1998).
64. Bornsen, ¶¶ 14-16, 804 N.W.2d at 60-61.
65. N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-01 (2008).
66. Id. § 1-01-06.
67. Bornsen, ¶ 14, 804 N.W.2d at 60 (quoting Treiber v. Citizens State Bank, 1999 ND 130,
¶ 16, 598 N.W.2d 96, 100).
68. Id. (quoting City of Dickinson v. Thress, 290 N.W. 653, 657 (1940)).
69. Bornsen, ¶ 11, 804 N.W.2d at 59; Briefs of Appellants, supra note 2, ¶ 14; Reply Brief
for Appellants ¶¶ 24-25, Bornsen v. Pragotrade, 2011 ND 183, 804 N.W.2d 55 (No. 20110087).
70. Bornsen, ¶ 11, 804 N.W.2d at 59; Brief for Appellants, supra note 2, ¶¶ 14-15, Reply
Brief for Appellants, supra note 69, ¶¶ 24-25.
71. Bornsen, ¶¶ 16-17, 804 N.W.2d at 61.
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the common law apparent manufacturer doctrine in product liability
claims.72
B. DISSENT ON ACCEPTANCE OF CERTIFICATION ORDER
Under the North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure, the North
Dakota Supreme Court may answer certified questions from, among others,
a federal district court involving questions of state law that may be
determinative in a proceeding where it appears no controlling precedent has
occurred in the decisions of the North Dakota Supreme Court.73 Justice
Kapsner, dissenting from this part of the majority’s analysis, did not feel the
court should take up the question in this case.74 This is based on the
findings from the United States District Court of North Dakota that
indicated the decision of the North Dakota Supreme Court would be
determinative as to the claim made by the Bornsens.75
Justice Crothers, writing for the majority, touched on this controversy
by detailing the different standards applicable to North Dakota state courts
compared to other courts seeking a certified answer to a question of North
Dakota law.76 Under North Dakota Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1,
applicable to North Dakota state courts, the certified question of law must
determine the outcome of the case.77 Under Rule 47, applicable to other
state appellate courts and federal courts, the certified question of law need
not be determinative.78 The public policy purpose for a higher standard
requiring the question be determinative for North Dakota courts as opposed
to foreign courts is due to the ability of either party to appeal any decision
to the North Dakota Supreme Court on questions of law, while a party to a
foreign court has no such remedy.79 In this instance, the certifying court
was based on a foreign jurisdiction, but certified the question as “being
determinative” which exceeded the standard required under the North
Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure.80 The question did not provide
sufficient facts as to why the question would be determinative, outside of
the inference made by Chief Judge Erickson’s opinion that the apparent
manufacturer doctrine would not be adopted.81
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
N.D. R. APP. P. 47(a).
Bornsen, ¶¶ 21-28, 802 N.W.2d at 62 (Kapsner, J., dissenting).
Id. ¶ 8, 804 N.W.2d at 58 (majority opinion).
Id. ¶ 7 (citing N.D. R. APP. P. 47.1(a)(1)(A)).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing McKenzie County v. Hodel, 467 N.W.2d 701, 704 (N.D. 1991)).
Id. ¶ 10, 804 N.W.2d at 59.
Id.
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Justice Crothers did not address the issue due to the importance of the
question involved to state tort doctrine and the clear division within the
United States District Court of North Dakota.82 Justice Kapsner disagreed
with the acceptance of the certification order, citing case law originating
from the model rule,83 upon which North Dakota’s rule is based, and
explaining the North Dakota Supreme Court has discretionary authority to
reject the certification order.84 Along with the discretionary nature granted
to the court, Justice Kapsner indicated the lack of all relevant facts to make
an informed decision does not meet the standard required to allow
acceptance of the certified order, and she believed the order should have
been denied.85
IV. IMPACT ON NORTH DAKOTA PRACTITIONERS
The results of this case require practitioners to consider two important
issues before pursuing or defending any claim. First, do the circumstances
of the case implicate an apparent manufacturer will automatically be a
defendant? Second, if an apparent manufacturer is implicated, can the suit
be filed in a jurisdiction outside North Dakota? Conversely, in regards to a
defendant, can a suit outside of North Dakota either be transferred back
within the state or have a choice of law analysis apply North Dakota law?
As part of this consideration, a practitioner must consider the original
jurisdiction’s choice of law analysis regardless of any possible transfer.
A. REJECTION OF DOCTRINE
The practical consideration for practitioners within North Dakota is the
inability of the apparent manufacturer doctrine to be used as a cause of
action within the state, or alternatively, whether North Dakota Century
Code section 28-0.13-04 serves as a defense against liability for suit filed
against one’s client.86 With the rejection of the apparent manufacturer
doctrine, North Dakota retailers selling a product with a trademark or brand
of the seller may deny it is a manufacturer.87 Estoppel against a retailer
denying the manufacture of the product is limited in North Dakota under

82. Id.
83. UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 66 (1967).
84. Bornsen, ¶ 23-24, 804 N.W.2d at 62-63 (Kapsner, J., dissenting) (citing Atlas Life Ins.
Co. v. W.I.S., Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 566 (1939); NLRB v. White Swan Co., 313 U.S. 23, 24 (1941)).
85. Id. ¶ 27, 804 N.W.2d at 64.
86. See supra Part III.A.
87. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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this ruling,88 but does require the nonmanufacturing seller to correctly
identify the true manufacturer.89
For retailers conducting business in North Dakota, the decision will
reduce the likelihood of a successful product liability action for any
defective product sold. This applies so long as the retailer is in compliance
with provisions of North Dakota Century Code section 28-01.3-04 requiring
the accurate identification of the actual manufacturer. The seller must also
assert it did not create the defect, did not control the design or
manufacturing of the product, and had no actual knowledge of the defect. 90
The opinion also does not bar additional claims made by a plaintiff as
indicated in other jurisdictions that have similarly rejected the apparent
manufacturer doctrine.91
B. CHOICE OF LAW CONSIDERATIONS
North Dakota has become an outlier in not adopting the apparent
manufacturer doctrine compared to most other states.92 This creates an
important decision for practitioners choosing an appropriate venue and
choice of law when filing suit or defending a products liability claim
involving nonmanufacturing sellers. With federal law establishing criteria
as to the applicability of a state’s choice of law analysis, this initial decision
will ultimately decide the success of the case.
1.

Choice of Venue Options for the Bornsens

In this case, the Bornsens had possible venues outside of North Dakota
in which to bring a products liability claim, including the location of sale
(Minnesota), and the location of the seller’s headquarters (Nebraska).93
Minnesota has a statute similar to North Dakota providing
nonmanufacturing retailers a defense from products liability action.94 As in
North Dakota, Minnesota allows a seller to escape liability if the true
manufacturer is identified and the seller has no significant control over the
design or manufacture of the product, had no actual knowledge of the
defect, and did not create the defect.95 However, Minnesota allows a
88. See discussion supra Part II.A.
89. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 16 and accompanying text
91. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
92. See supra Part II.A.2.
93. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 2, ¶ 1; Cabela’s Retail Inc. is headquartered in
Sidney, Nebraska. Investor’s Relations Company Overview, CABELA’S, http://phx.corporate-ir.net
/phoenix.zhtml?c=177739&p=irol-irhome (last visited Dec. 7, 2012).
94. MINN. STAT. § 544.41 (2010).
95. Id. § 544.41 subdiv. (3).

490

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 88:477

plaintiff to return to the nonmanufacturing seller if the true manufacturer
cannot satisfy a reasonable settlement or judgment as determined by the
court.96 This has provided plaintiffs an avenue to pursue a claim against a
nonmanufacturing seller that would otherwise be denied.97 However,
nothing in the Bornsen record indicates an exception to the Minnesota
statute imposing liability on Cabela’s.
Nebraska’s statutory scheme appears to prohibit adoption of the
apparent manufacturer doctrine, as product liability actions are prohibited
“against any seller or lessor of a product which is alleged to contain or
possess a defective condition” unless the seller has manufactured the
product or defective part.98 However, both the Nebraska Supreme Court
and United States District Court of Nebraska have declined to consider
whether this statute specifically precludes adoption of the doctrine.99 As
such, a filing by the Bornsens in Nebraska would not necessarily change the
result of the suit.
2.

Importance of the Original Venue in Choice of Law Analysis

With precedent set by the rejection of the apparent manufacturer
doctrine in North Dakota, practitioners considering filing a products
liability action may consider a forum outside of North Dakota as a venue
for the claim. If the action is made in federal district court based on
diversity jurisdiction, or removed from a state court, the law applicable in
the original forum will follow even if the venue is transferred.100 This
includes the choice of law analysis of the original forum state.101
For example, if a claim is made in the United States Federal District
Court of Minnesota, and subsequently transferred to North Dakota, the
North Dakota Federal District Court is required to use the Minnesota choice
of law analysis.102 For Minnesota, this is the significant contacts test
requiring an analysis of five choice-influencing factors including: “(1)
Predictability of results; (2) Maintenance of interstate and international
order; (3) Simplification of the judicial task, (4) Advancement of the

96. Id. § 544.41 subdiv. (2)(e).
97. Finke v. Hunter’s View, Ltd., 596 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1270-71 (D. Minn. 2009).
98. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21, 181 (2008).
99. Sherman v. Sunsong Am., Inc., 485 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1079-80 (D. Neb. 2007); Stones v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 558 N.W.2d 540, 545 (Neb. 1997).
100. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 523 (1990).
101. Id.; Eggleton v. Plasser & Theurer Export Von Bahnbaumaschinen Gesellschaft, MBH,
495 F.3d 582, 585-86 (8th Cir. 2007).
102. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Kamrath, 475 F.3d 920, 924 (8th Cir. 2007).
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forum’s governmental interest; and (5) Application of the better rule of
law.”103
Predictability of results relates to the ideal outcome that a claim with
the same facts will be decided the same regardless of the forum.104 This is
less likely in personal injury cases, due to the unpredictability of accidents
and harm.105 For maintenance of interstate order, the concern is that
application of an outside forum’s law would infringe on the sovereignty of
the home forum.106 In a case of differing application of products liability
law, this factor typically favors the state with the most significant contacts
with the facts relevant to the litigation.107 The Minnesota Supreme Court
has typically not given much weight to simplification of the judicial task
outside of an absence of precedent indicating a true conflict exists between
the laws, and have not traditionally followed the fifth factor of the better
rule of law.108 The fourth factor identifies which law advances a significant
interest of the forum.109 For product liability claims in Minnesota, the
analysis will consider whether a direct and relevant connection occurs
between a state and the facts underlying the litigation.110 However, if no
factor favors either state, the state where the accident occurred will maintain
the strongest governmental interest.111
If Minnesota is the original venue and the application of the law is in
conflict with North Dakota law and would be determinative, the North
Dakota court is required to apply Minnesota’s choice of law analysis to
determine which law will apply.112 Should the claim be filed in North
Dakota, but one or more parties assert an outside jurisdiction’s case law
applies, the relevant choice of law analysis for North Dakota requires a twopronged test.113 The first test is a significant contacts test where “all of the
relevant contacts which might logically influence the decision of which law
to apply” are considered by the court.114 In consideration of torts cases, the
relevant contacts are “the place where the injury occurred; the place where
103. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 604 N.W.2d 91, 94 (Minn. 2000).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 95.
107. Hughes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 250 F.3d 618, 620-21 (8th Cir. 2001).
108. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 604 N.W.2d at 96-97.
109. Id. at 95.
110. Nelson v. Delta Int’l Mach. Corp., No. 06-63 (DSD/JJG), 2006 WL 1283896, at *4 (D.
Minn. May 9, 2006).
111. Id.; Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 604 N.W.2d at 92.
112. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Kamrath, 475 F.3d 920, 924 (8th Cir. 2007).
113. Issendorf v. Olson, 194 N.W.2d 750, 756 (N.D. 1972).
114. Daley v. Am. States Preferred Ins. Co., 1998 ND 225, ¶ 12, 587 N.W.2d 159, 162
(citing Issendorf v. Olson, 194 N.W.2d 750, 755 (N.D. 1972)).
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the conduct causing the injury occurred; the domicile, nationality,
residence, place of business, or place of incorporation of the parties; and the
place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.”115
The second prong centers on a choice-influencing test.116 Those
factors are the same as the Minnesota test cited above.117 In cases of tort
claims, including product liability claims, “the fourth and fifth factors are
the most significant.”118 As strict liability of defective products falls into
the tort category, those two prongs can weigh significantly on North Dakota
choice of law, especially where litigation is based on an injury to a North
Dakota plaintiff and occurred within the state of North Dakota.119 This
likelihood may prevent litigation from originating in North Dakota.
Practitioners filing suit should consider an alternative venue if the claim and
recovery of damages depend on including a nonmanufacturing entity.
Alternatively, retailers defending such a suit may consider the significant
contacts of the case, relying on the domicile of the plaintiff and the location
where the injury occurred, if it favors application of North Dakota law.
V. CONCLUSION
The North Dakota Supreme Court’s rejection of the apparent
manufacturer doctrine in Bornsen v. Pragotrade, LLC120 resolves the split
within the United States District Court of North Dakota established by the
precedent set in Reiss. The opinion firmly removes North Dakota from
most other jurisdictions in imposing strict liability for defective products on
nonmanufacturing sellers. As a result, practitioners for both plaintiffs and
defendants in product liability actions will need to consider closely which
forum they choose in filing a claim based on the state’s applicable product
liability statutory scheme, as well as what choice of law rules would apply.
Moving for a change in venue as a defendant back to North Dakota may not
relieve the defendant of liability. However, North Dakota’s consideration
of significant contacts within the state strongly favor applying the law of

115. Id. ¶ 14 n.3.
116. Polensky v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 397 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1169 (D.N.D. 2005) (citing Robert
A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 282
(1966)).
117. Polensky, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 1169.
118. Id. at 1170 (citing DeRemer v. Pac. Intermountain Express Co., 353 N.W.2d 694, 697
(Minn. App. 1984); Brown v. Church of the Holy Name of Jesus, 252 A.2d 176, 180-81 (R.I.
1969); Hataway v. McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53, 58 (Tenn. 1992)).
119. Polensky, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 1171.
120. 2011 ND 183, 804 N.W.2d 55.
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the state where the accident occurred, and may give similar importance if
the original venue’s choice of law analysis mirrors North Dakota’s rules.
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